Sovereign Debt Restructuring: How It Works and Why It Takes So Long
How countries restructure debt without a bankruptcy court: IMF, Paris Club and bondholder steps, cases from Argentina to Zambia, and lessons for investors.

There is no bankruptcy court for countries
When a company cannot pay its debts, a court can supervise a restructuring. When a country cannot, no such court exists. Sovereign borrowers cannot be liquidated, their assets are mostly protected, and creditors can only negotiate or sue. As a result, sovereign debt restructurings are political and financial negotiations that are slow, uneven and shaped by who the creditors are. This guide explains how the process works, using real cases, and what it means for investors and borrowers.
The usual sequence
- Stress and default. A country loses market access, spends reserves, and eventually misses payments or announces it will suspend them.
- An IMF programme. The IMF assesses debt sustainability and financing needs as part of programme design. Where debt is assessed as unsustainable, financing assurances and a credible debt treatment are generally needed before the programme can proceed; the precise requirements depend on the case and the IMF’s policies. See the IMF’s IMF and Debt explainer.
- Official creditors negotiate. Governments that have lent bilaterally negotiate under frameworks such as the Paris Club, which has operated since 1956, or, for many low-income countries, the G20's Common Framework, launched in 2020.
- Private creditors negotiate. Bondholders and banks must offer terms "comparable" to those given by official creditors, in principle.
- Exchange and closing. Old bonds are swapped for new ones with lower principal, lower interest, longer maturities, or all three.
Why it takes so long
- Many creditors with different interests. Bilateral lenders, multilateral lenders, bondholders and banks all hold different types of claims.
- China's role. China became one of the largest bilateral lenders to developing countries but is not a member of the Paris Club, which made coordination harder in the early Common Framework cases.
- Disputes over comparability. Creditors argue about what counts as comparable treatment and who should take the biggest loss.
- Holdouts. Some bondholders refuse to participate and sue for full payment. The best-known case is Argentina, whose long legal fight with holdout funds led to a 2012 New York court ruling on the "pari passu" clause and delayed its return to markets.
To limit holdouts, bond contracts may include collective action clauses, which allow a specified supermajority of bondholders to bind the minority under the contract’s voting rules. The exact effect depends on the clause wording and governing law; do not assume every bond uses the same aggregation mechanism. See the ICMA guidance on collective action clauses.
Recent cases at a glance
| Country | Default | What stood out |
|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 2001 (about 95 billion dollars); restructured 2005, 2010 and again 2020 | Years of holdout litigation; repeated returns to markets |
| Greece | 2012 restructuring of privately held debt, the largest ever at the time | Mostly domestic law bonds; bondholders accepted large losses; official lenders remained dominant creditors |
| Zambia | 2020 Eurobond default | The Official Creditor Committee agreed an MoU in October 2023; Zambia completed its Eurobond exchange on 11 June 2024. These were separate steps, not one completed restructuring of every external claim. |
| Sri Lanka | April 2022 | IMF programme, negotiations with China and India as major bilateral lenders, and bondholder deal after long talks |
| Ghana | December 2022 | IMF programme in 2023, domestic debt exchange first, then external negotiations |
| Ethiopia | Missed a Eurobond payment in December 2023 | A Common Framework case with a long process |
Implementation update (April 2026): The IMF–World Bank Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable reported that most restructuring cases launched in 2021–22—including Zambia and Ghana under the Common Framework, and Sri Lanka outside it—were largely completed by April 2026. However, final bilateral agreements implementing official-creditor memoranda were still incomplete in most cases, and some residual commercial claims remained. This distinction matters: a bond exchange or agreement in principle does not necessarily mean every claim in the restructuring perimeter has been fully settled. See the IMF’s 6th Co-Chairs Progress Report (15 April 2026).
What creditors usually lose
Recoveries vary widely. Restructurings can reduce the present value of claims substantially, through lower face value, lower interest rates or longer maturities. Studies of past cases find that average losses for bondholders were large but differed by country and period. The honest answer for an investor is that sovereign defaults do not follow a single pattern, and the timeline from default to settlement has often stretched over several years.
Newer ideas to speed things up
- The Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, launched in 2023 by the IMF, the World Bank and the G20 presidency, brings debtor countries, official and private creditors together to align on process and information.
- State-contingent instruments link payments to economic outcomes, such as GDP warrants used by Ukraine, so creditors share in recovery.
- Debt-for-nature and similar swaps trade debt relief for commitments on conservation or development.
- Climate-resilient debt clauses allow payments to be paused after a disaster.
What it means for different readers
Investors
Check the legal terms of the bond: governing law, collective action clauses, ranking and any collateral. Understand who the other large creditors are, and whether the country has an IMF programme. A low price does not mean a good deal if recovery is slow or uncertain.
Governments
Act early. Countries that engage creditors before reserves are exhausted generally face lower economic costs than those that wait. Clear data about debts, including those to China and state companies, builds trust.
Businesses operating in the country
Watch for capital controls, currency devaluation and delayed payments by state entities. Contracts in hard currency may not be fully protected if the central bank cannot supply foreign exchange.
For the Africa-specific picture, see our article on African sovereign debt restructuring, and for another form of sovereign risk, sovereign asset seizure risks.
Frequently asked questions
Can a country go bankrupt?
Not in the legal sense. A country can default on its debt and restructure it, but there is no process that liquidates its assets and ends its existence.
What is the Paris Club?
A group of mainly Western creditor governments that coordinates the treatment of official bilateral debt of countries in difficulty. It has operated since 1956.
What is a haircut?
The loss that creditors take, usually expressed as the reduction in the present value of their claim.
Do defaults close a country out of markets forever?
No. Many countries, including Argentina and Greece, returned to markets, though often at higher interest rates and after a delay.
Sources and further reading
- IMF, Zambia: Third Review—Debt Sustainability Analysis (2024), documenting the 2020 Eurobond default, January 2021 Common Framework request and October 2023 official-creditor MoU.
- IMF, Zambia: Fourth Review under the Extended Credit Facility (2024), recording completion of the Eurobond exchange on 11 June 2024.
- IMF, Zambia: Sixth Review—Debt Sustainability Analysis (2026), for subsequent progress and the remaining restructuring perimeter.
- Paris Club, institutional history and creditor framework.
- ICMA, Collective Action Clauses guidance.
- IMF and World Bank, Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable.
Cases and terms are drawn from public sources and continue to change. This article is general information, not investment advice.
The information provided is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.


